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PARTIES TO APPEAL 
Appellant: Chad Hudgens ("Hudgens"). 
Appellees: Prosper, Inc. and Joshua Christopherson (collectively '"Prosper" or 
"defendants"). 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. § 78A-3-102(3)(k) and 
Article 8, § I of the Utah Constitution. This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Fourth 
Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah, entered on March 27, 2009. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DISMISSING HUDGENS' CLAIMS FOR 
ASSAULT AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY WERE PRECLUDED BY THE 
EXCLUSIVITY PROVISION OF THE UTAH WORKER'S COMPENSATION 
ACT, U.C.A. § 34A-2-105. 
Standard of Review: The Trial Court's decision to dismiss a cause of action under 
U. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is reviewed for correctness. Wintergreen Group v. Utah Dept. Of 
Transp.. 171 P.3d 418, 420-21 (Utah 2007). 
Preservation of Issue For Review: Hudgens' Opposition to Prosper's Motion to 
Dismiss, R. 69-44; Hudgens' Motion and Memorandum for Leave to File an Amended 
Complaint and Reply Memorandum, R. 107-93, 177-70; Notice of Appeal, R. 193-92. 
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Grounds For Review of Any Issues Not Preserved: The Trial Court committed 
plain error in dismissing Hudgens' claims of assault and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. The error should have been obvious to the Trial Court and the error is harmful to 
Hudgens. Therefore, appellate court review of this case is appropriate. State Ex Rel T.M., 
73 P.3d 959, 963 (Utah App. 2003). 
IL THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PROSPER'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS HUDGENS' WRONGFUL TERMINATION CLAIM ON THE 
GROUNDS THAT HUDGENS HAD FAILED TO SATISFY THE PUBLIC 
POLICY EXCEPTION. 
Standard of Review: The Trial Court's decision to dismiss a cause of action under 
U. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is reviewed for correctness. Wintergreen Group, 171 P.3dat420-21. 
Preservation of Issue For Review: Hudgens' Opposition to Prosper's Motion to 
Dismiss, R. 69-44; Hudgens' Motion and Memorandum for Leave to File an Amended 
Complaint and Reply Memorandum, R. 107-93, 177-70; Notice of Appeal, R. 193-92. 
Grounds For Review of Any Issues Not Preserved: The Trial Court committed 
plain error in dismissing Hudgens' wrongful termination claim. The error should have been 
obvious to the Trial Court and the error is harmful to Hudgens. Therefore, appellate court 
review of this case is appropriate. State Ex Rel T.M., 73 P.3d at 963 (Utah App. 2003). 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING HUDGENS' 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
Standard of Review: Denial of the Motion for Leave to Amend is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion. Turville v. J&J Properties. LC 145 P.3d 1146, 1150 (Utah App. 2006). 
Preservation of Issue For Review: Hudgens' Motion and Memorandum for Leave 
to File an Amended Complaint and Reply Memorandum, R. 107-93, 177-70; Notice of 
Appeal, R. 193-92 
Grounds For Review of Any Issues Not Preserved: The Trial Court committed 
plain error in denying Hudgens leave to amend his Complaint. The error should have been 
obvious to the Trial Court and the error is harmful to Hudgens. Therefore, appellate court 
review of this case is appropriate. State Ex Rel T.M., 73 P.3d at 963 (Utah App. 2003). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of The Case 
This case arises from an episode where appellant Chad Hudgens was assaulted by his 
supervisor at work as part of a training exercise. Specifically, Prosper executive Joshua 
Christopherson, with specific intent to inflict an injury upon Hudgens, waterboarded 
Hudgens by pouring a gallon jug of water into Hudgens' nose and mouth while Hudgens' 
co-workers held him down. Hudgens was unable to continue working at Prosper and left 
shortly after the incident. 
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Course of Proceedings 
Hudgens filed suit against defendants on January 17,2008. See Verified Complaint, 
Addendum, Ex. A, R. 11-3. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that Hudgens' 
claims were precluded by the Utah Worker's Compensation Act, U.C.A. § 34A-2-105 and 
also that Hudgens had failed to state a claim for wrongful termination. On July 23,2008, the 
Trial Court granted Prosper's Motion to Dismiss without prejudice. See July 23, 2008 
Ruling, Addendum, Ex. B, R. 92-85. On October 3,2008, Hudgens filed a Motion for Leave 
to File an Amended Complaint and attached a Proposed Amended Verified Complaint. See 
Proposed Amended Complaint, Addendum, Ex. C, R. 102-93. Defendants opposed that 
motion and moved to have Hudgens' Complaint dismissed with prejudice. On February 10, 
2009, after oral argument, the Trial Court denied Hudgens' Motion for Leave to File an 
Amended Complaint and granted defendants' Motion to Dismiss Hudgens' Complaint with 
prejudice. 
Disposition in The Lower Court 
The Court entered a final judgment in favor of Prosper on March 27, 2009. This is 
an appeal from that entire decision. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff Chad Hudgens is a resident of Utah County, Utah. Verified Complaint 
at 1| 1, Addendum, Ex. A, R. 11. 
2. Defendant Prosper, Inc. is a resident of Utah County, Utah. Verified 
Complaint at f^ 2, Addendum, Ex. A, R. 11. 
3. Defendant Joshua Christopherson is a resident of Utah County, Utah. Verified 
Complaint at f^ 3, Addendum, Ex. A, R. 11. 
4. Prosper provides self-help and motivational coaching to individual clients. 
During all relevant times, Hudgens was an employee of Prosper. Verified Complaint at f 6, 
Addendum, Ex. A, R. 10. 
5. Hudgens was 26 years old and had been working at Prosper for 10 months at 
the time of the episodes alleged herein. Verified Complaint at ^ f 7, Addendum, Ex. A, R. 10. 
6. During all relevant times Christopherson was an employee of Prosper. Upon 
information and belief, Christopherson was one of Prosper's top income producers. Verified 
Complaint at ^ 8, Addendum, Ex. A, R. 10. 
7. During all relevant times, Hudgens was a member of Christopherson's team. 
Verified Complaint at ^ 9, Addendum, Ex. A, R. 10. 
8. On or about May 29, 2007, Christopherson asked for volunteers for a new 
motivational exercise. In his search for volunteers, Christopherson specifically challenged 
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the loyalty and determination of his team members. Christopherson did not disclose what the 
exercise was. In an effort to prove his loyalty and determination to Christopherson and 
Prosper, and thereby be considered a favored member of the team, Hudgens volunteered. 
Verified Complaint at f 12, Addendum, Ex. A, R. 9. 
9. Christopherson marched his entire team to the top of a hill outside the office. 
He ordered Hudgens to lie down with his head facing downhill. He instructed the other team 
members to hold Hudgens by the arms and legs. Verified Complaint at ^  13, Addendum, Ex. 
A, R. 9. 
10. Christopherson then slowly poured a gallon jug of water over Hudgens' mouth 
and nostrils, thereby making it impossible for Hudgens to breathe for a sustained period of 
time. Verified Complaint at *§ 14, Addendum, Ex. A, R. 9. 
11. Christopherson's exercise is more commonly known as "waterboarding," a 
controversial coercive interrogation technique which some people and governments consider 
torture. It is designed to, among other things, cause injury by creating panic and confusion 
in the subject by creating the impression in the subject that he is drowning. Verified 
Complaint at f^ 15, Addendum, Ex. A, R. 9. 
12. Christopherson directed Hudgens' team members to hold him down even 
though Hudgens was struggling and resisting and was attempting to escape. Christopherson 
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did not stop pouring water into Hudgens' mouth and nostrils even though he saw that 
Hudgens was struggling to breathe. Verified Complaint at *§16, Addendum, Ex. A, R. 9. 
13. Christopherson had a conscious and deliberate intent to injure Hudgens by use 
of waterboarding. This is so because Christopherson believed that the only way in which the 
motivational exercise could succeed was to cause Hudgens to experience the panic and 
suffocation integral to the purpose and functioning of waterboarding. This is why 
Christopherson directed a team member to hold Hudgens' head in place so that it would not 
move as he poured water in Hudgens' nose and mouth. This is why Christopherson did not 
stop pouring water into Hudgens' nose and mouth until the jug was empty even though he 
saw Hudgens struggling to breathe. In other words, by consciously and deliberately 
waterboarding Hudgens, Christopherson exhibited a conscious and deliberate intent to cause 
an injury to Hudgens. Proposed Verified Amended Complaint at f^ 17, Addendum, Ex. C, 
R.99. 
14. Following Christopherson's intentional assault, Hudgens approached someone 
in Prosper's human resources department and explained what had just happened to him. 
Despite disclosing this information, Prosper took no action, including action against 
Christopherson, until after Hudgens left Prosper. Verified Complaint at J^ 18, Addendum, 
Ex. A, R. 8. 
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15. Following Christopherson's assault, Hudgens began to experience symptoms 
of sleeplessness, anxiety and depression. He began to feel sick to his stomach at work and 
was no longer able to work at Prosper. Verified Complaint at ^ j 19, Addendum, Ex. A, R. 8. 
16. Because of the trauma caused by Prosper's sales exercises, Hudgens has 
required psychological counseling and has suffered physical and emotional harm. Verified 
Complaint at f 20, Addendum, Ex. A, R.8. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN DISMISSING 
HUDGENS' CLAIMS FOR ASSAULT AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY WERE 
PRECLUDED BY THE EXCLUSIVITY PROVISION OF THE UTAH 
WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT, U.C.A. § 34A-2-105. 
Hudgens stated a claim for assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress in 
both his Complaint and proposed Amended Complaint that easily avoided the exclusivity 
provision of the Worker's Compensation Act. Specifically, Hudgens pled that Prosper acted 
with a conscious and deliberate intent to injure Hudgens by use of waterboarding techniques 
as part of a training exercise because it knew or expected that the use of those techniques 
would cause an injury to Hudgens. The allegations of both the Complaint and proposed 
Amended Complaint clearly and expressly identify the elements necessary to state cognizable 
claims under Utah law. The Trial Court did not apply the standards for dismissing a 
complaint correctly and erred in dismissing Hudgens' Complaint. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN DISMISSING 
HUDGENS' CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL TERMINATION ON THE GROUNDS 
THAT HUDGENS HAD FAILED TO PLEAD A PUBLIC POLICY 
EXCEPTION TO THE AT-WILL DOCTRINE. 
Hudgens identified a public policy interest that constituted an exception to the at-will 
doctrine. Specifically, there is a public policy interest in the emotional and physical safety 
and integrity of Utah citizens, particularly in the work place. This policy can be gleaned 
from numerous civil and criminal statutory prohibitions against assault and battery as well 
as laws and regulations requiring employers to maintain a safe workplace. 
These laws and regulations evidence an intent by the Utah Legislature and the Utah 
Court system to establish a legal context and framework in which the physical and emotional 
integrity of its citizens are protected from unwarranted, intentionally abusive intrusion, such 
as in this case. A termination resulting from a violation of this policy is an exception to the 
at-will doctrine as articulated by Utah law. Therefore, the Trial Court erred in dismissing this 
claim. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING HUDGENS' 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT. 
Utah law has long recognized that leave to amend should be freely given when justice 
so requires. Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Utah 1993); U. R. Civ. P. 15(a). In 
this case, Hudgens prepared a proposed Amended Complaint which directly addressed the 
deficiencies in his original Complaint identified by the Trial Court its July 23 Ruling, 
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particularly with respect to Hudgens' wrongful termination claim. Without allowing any 
discovery or the development of any factual record, and without providing any written 
explanation for its reasoning, the Trial Court denied Hudgens leave to amend. The Trial 
Court abused its discretion in not allowing Hudgens to amend his Complaint to develop facts 
that supported his claims and that would entitle him to relief. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN DISMISSING 
HUDGENS' CLAIMS FOR ASSAULT AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY WERE 
PRECLUDED BY THE EXCLUSIVITY PROVISION OF THE UTAH 
WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT, U.C.A. § 34A-2-105. 
At the outset, it is important to remember the procedural posture of this case at the 
Trial Court level. Before answering, Prosper filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. The 
Trial Court granted that motion without prejudice and allowed Hudgens the opportunity to 
file a Motion for Leave to Amend his Complaint. The Trial Court subsequently denied 
Hudgens5 Motion for Leave to Amend and granted Prosper's Motion to Amend the Court's 
original dismissal order to dismiss Hudgens' Complaint with prejudice. Keeping this 
procedural background in mind will assist this Court in analyzing the issues raised by 
Hudgens' appeal. Specifically, the Trial Court failed to apply the long known standard for 
granting motions to dismiss and, similarly, failed to see that Hudgens had adequately pled 
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claims for intentional torts in both his original Complaint and in his proposed Amended 
Complaint. 
A. The Trial Court Misapplied The Controlling Standards For Reviewing 
Motions to Dismiss. 
It is well-settled that dismissal under U. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is improper unless 
Hudgens can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief. Russell/Packard 
Development. Inc. v. Carson. 78 P.3d 616, 620 (Utah App. 2003). Of course, in ruling on 
a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Trial Court was required to construe the 
Complaint in a light most favorable to Hudgens and indulge all reasonable inferences in his 
favor. Helf v. Chevron U.S.A.. Inc.. 203 P.3d 962, 965 (Utah 2009). In addition, it is well-
settled that "[dismissal of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is a severe measure given the 
liberality of notice pleading and must be granted only when it is apparent that under 
no set of facts proven in support of the claims as pleaded would a party be entitled to 
relief." Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson. Inc.. 815 P.2d 1356, 1360 (Utah App. 1991) (citing 
Colman v. Utah State Land Board. 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990)) (emphasis added). 
These generally applicable standards are not suspended simply because this case 
involves a challenge to the exclusivity provision of the Utah Worker's Compensation Act, 
U.C.A. § 34A-2-105. The cases relied upon by Prosper in the Trial Court, particularly Lantz 
v. NatT. Semiconductor Corp.. 775 P.2d 937 (Utah App. 1989), do not articulate a standard 
for reading a complaint that is any different than the standard articulated by Hudgens here 
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nor does the fact that the case involves the applicability of the Worker's Compensation Act 
change in any way the level of scrutiny the Trial Court should have applied to the allegations 
in both Hudgens' Complaint and Proposed Amended Complaint. 
Moreover, in a case decided by this Court days after the Trial Court denied Hudgens' 
Motion for Leave to Amend and dismissed his Complaint with prejudice, this Court reversed 
a dismissal of a claim that shared many pleading similarities with the instant matter. In Helf 
v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 203 P.3d 962 (Utah 2009), the Court ruled that a complaint that 
alleged that defendants knew or expected that their conduct would cause an injury satisfied 
the "intent to injure" standard set forth under Utah law in cases such as Lantz, supra. 
In Helf, the Court conducted a painstaking review of Utah case law concerning 
whether an employee has stated a claim for workplace injury that is not barred by the Utah 
Worker's Compensation Act. The Court articulated the controlling standard: 
We therefore hold that the 'intent to injure9 standard 
requires a specific mental state in which the actor knew or 
expected that injury would be the consequence of his 
actions. To demonstrate intent, a plaintiff may show that 
the actor desired the consequences of his actions or that the 
actor believed the consequences were virtually certain to 
result . . . In other words, the employer must know or 
expect that a specific employee will be injured doing a 
specific task. 
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Helf, 203 P.3d at 974 (emphasis added). Applying these standards, it is clear that Hudgens 
adequately pled claims for intentional injury in both his original and proposed Amended 
Complaint. 
B. Hudgens Has Pled Sufficient Facts to Overcome The Exclusivity Provision 
of the Utah Worker's Compensation Act 
In the July 23 Ruling, the Trial Court determined: 
The allegations contained in the Complaint are not sufficient to 
support a claim that the defendant had a conscious and 
deliberate intent to injure plaintiff The Complaint contains 
no facts showing that Christopherson took his actions based on 
a conscious and deliberate intent to injure plaintiff. 
July 23 Ruling, Addendum, Ex. B., R. 89. This was error. 
In his original Complaint, Hudgens alleged as follows: 
12. On or about May 29, 2007, Christopherson asked for 
volunteers for a new motivational exercise. In his search 
for volunteers, Christopherson specifically challenged 
the loyalty and determination of his team members. 
Christopherson did not disclose what the exercise was. 
In an effort to prove his loyalty and determination to 
Christopherson and Prosper, Hudgens volunteered. 
13. Christopherson marched his entire team to the top of hill 
outside the office. He ordered Hudgens to lie down with 
his head facing downhill. He instructed the other team 
members to hold Hudgens by the arms and legs. 
14. Christopherson then slowly poured a gallon jug of water 
over Hudgens' mouth and nostrils, thereby making it 
impossible for Hudgens [to] breath[e] for a sustained 
period of time. 
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15. Christopherson's exercise is more commonly known as 
"water boarding" a controversial coercive interrogation 
technique which some people and governments consider 
torture. It is designed to, among other things, create 
panic and confusion in the subject by creating the 
impression in the subject that he is drowning. 
16. Christopherson directed Hudgens' team members to hold 
him down even though Hudgens was struggling and 
resisting and was attempting to escape. 
17. At the conclusion of his abusive demonstration, 
Christopherson told the team that he wanted them to 
work as hard on making sales as Chad had worked to 
breathe while he was being waterboarded. 
Verified Complaint, Addendum, Ex. A, R. 11-8. 
Of particular importance is paragraph 17, where Christopherson acknowledges his 
awareness that Hudgens was experiencing the intended and injurious effects of the 
waterboarding exercise, i.e., panic and suffocation, because he wanted to tell his team to 
work as hard on sales as Hudgens had worked on breathing. Verified Complaint, Addendum, 
Ex. A, R. 8. This conclusion is amply supported by paragraph 16 of the Complaint where 
Hudgens alleges that Christopherson directed his team to restrain Hudgens even though "he 
was struggling and resisting and attempting to escape" (emphasis added). Verified 
Complaint, Addendum, Ex. A, R. 9. In other words, Christopherson knew or expected that 
Hudgens would suffer a specific injury - panic and suffocation. Accordingly, the intent to 
injure standard as articulated by this Court has been satisfied. Hejf, 203 P.3d at 974. Nor 
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is it significant, as Prosper argued below, R. 159, that Prosper was motivated by a desire to 
inspire the sales team to improve performance. The Court in Helf recognized the important 
difference between motive and intent. 
[T]he legal definition of intent encompasses more than 
simply motive. . . . The distinction between intent and 
motive is particularly important in applying the intent to 
injure' standard because an intentional injury may arise in 
instances where the employer intentionally placed an 
employee in harm's way, but the employer's motive was to 
increase profits - not to inflict injury. 
Helf, 203 P.3d at 972 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court concluded, the ''intent to injure" 
standard may be satisfied regardless of the specific motive of the employer. Id. at 973. 
Additionally, as stated, the specific conduct alleged in Hudgens' Complaint must be 
taken as true for the purposes of a Motion to Dismiss and Hudgens was entitled to all 
reasonable inferences arising from those allegations. Helf 203 P.3d at 965. Clearly, then, 
Hudgens adequately pled that defendants' conduct was a deliberate and conscious intent to 
inflict an injury upon him. It appears that the Trial Court did not grant Hudgens the 
inferences from these allegations that defendants knew or expected that their conduct would 
injure him. This was error. 
However, even if the Trial Court were correct in its July 23 Ruling, Hudgens cured 
any deficiencies in his proposed Amended Complaint. Specifically, Hudgens alleged: 
Christopherson had a conscious and deliberate intent to 
injure Hudgens by use of waterboarding. This is so because 
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Christopherson believed that the only way in which the 
motivational exercise could succeed was to cause Hudgens to 
experience the panic and suffocation integral to the purpose 
and functioning of waterboarding. This is why 
Christopherson directed a team member to hold Hudgens' 
head in place so that it would not move as he poured water 
in Hudgens' nose and mouth. This is why Christopherson 
did not stop pouring water into Hudgens' nose and mouth 
until the jug was empty even though he saw Hudgens 
struggling to breathe. In other words, by consciously and 
deliberately waterboarding Hudgens, Christopherson 
exhibited a conscious and deliberate intent to cause an 
injury to Hudgens. 
Proposed Verified Amended Complaint at f 17, Addendum, Ex. C, R. 99 (emphasis added). 
This allegation in the proposed Amended Complaint clearly satisfies the pleading 
requirements the Trial Court claimed were missing from Hudgens' original Complaint. 
Hudgens satisfied all applicable pleading requirements under Rule 12(b)(6) and Helf, if not 
in his original Complaint then certainly in his proposed Amended Complaint. Accordingly, 
the Trial Court committed clear error and its ruling dismissing Hudgens' claims for assault 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress should be reversed. Additionally, as explained 
herein, the Trial Court's refusal to allow Hudgens to amend his Complaint was an abuse of 
discretion. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN DISMISSING 
HUDGENS' CLAIM OF WRONGFUL TERMINATION ON THE GROUNDS 
THAT HUDGENS HAD FAILED TO ADEQUATELY PLEAD A PUBLIC 
POLICY EXCEPTION TO THE AT-WILL DOCTRINE, 
In its July 23 Ruling, the Trial Court determined that Hudgens ^failed to make out a 
prima facie case for wrongful termination in violation of public policy." July 23 Ruling, 
Addendum, Ex. B, R. 87. The Trial Court also determined that the connection between the 
policies referred to by Hudgens and "the conduct in question here is far too tenuous" to 
satisfy the requirements articulated by the Utah Supreme Court for satisfying the public 
policy exception to the at-will doctrine. Addendum, Ex. B, R. 87. This ruling was in error. 
As a preliminary matter, Hudgens agrees that in order for him to make out a prima 
facie case of wrongful termination, he must show (1) that defendants terminated him; (2) that 
a clear and substantial public policy existed; (3) that this termination of Hudgens under the 
circumstances jeopardizes that public policy; (4) that the discharge and the conduct bringing 
the policy into play are causally connected. Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 
404 (Utah 1998). 
Hudgens adequately alleged that he was constructively terminated as a result of the 
waterboarding incident and defendants' failure to take any action when notified of it. More 
importantly, Hudgens' constructive termination violated a clear and substantial public policy 
interest under Utah law. Specifically, the termination, and particularly the circumstances 
giving rise to it, violated the public policy underlying the numerous statutory and common 
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law protections and penalties regarding the physical and emotional integrity of Utah citizens, 
especially in the employment context. 
For example, the civil and criminal prohibitions against assault and battery are quite 
clear. See, e ^ , MUJI 10.18 (1993) (and cases cited); U.C.A. §§ 76-5-102 (assault); 102.3 
(assault against school employees); 102.4 (assault against a peace officer); 102.7 (assault 
against health care provider) and 107.5 (''hazing"). Indeed, Section 107.5 is particularly apt 
since ^hazing" is defined as an intentional, knowing or reckless act that 
endangers the mental or physical health or safety of another; or 
. . . involves brutality of a physical nature . . . or involves 
consumption of any. . . substance or other physical activity that 
endangers the mental or physical health and safety of an 
individual; or involves any activity that would subject the 
individual to extreme mental stress . . . . and is for the purpose 
of initiation, admission into, affiliation with, holding office in, 
or as a condition for continued membership in any organization. 
Section 107.5 refers to intentional physical abuse as an element of admission to a 
group or continued membership therein. This point is important because, in both his 
Complaint and proposed Amended Complaint at paragraph 12, Hudgens-alleges %cin his 
search for volunteers Christopherson specifically challenged the loyalty and determination 
of his team members." R. 9 and R. 100. Thus, the physical abuse Christopherson 
intentionally inflicted upon Hudgens was part of Christopherson's challenge to the member 
of his team to remain favored within the group. 
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In addition, there are numerous regulations dealing with workplace safety. See, e.g., 
U.C.A. § 34-6-201, the Utah Occupational Safety and Health Act, which states: ~Each 
employer shall furnish each of the employer's employees employment and a place of 
employment free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or 
physical harm to the employer's employees and comply with the standards promulgated 
under this chapter." See also Declaration of Governor Jon M. Huntsman for National Safety 
Month, June, 2007. Addendum, Ex. D, R. 168. 
By extension, there are also provisions which protect the physical privacy of Utah 
workers. See, e.g., U.C.A. § 34-38-1 et secj., the Utah Employee Drug Testing Act. These 
laws and regulations evidence an intent by the Utah Legislature and the Utah Court System 
to establish a legal context and framework in which the physical and emotional integrity of 
its citizens are protected from unwarranted, intentional or abusive intrusions - precisely the 
situation presented by this case. 
Hudgens readily acknowledges that there is no express policy forbidding employer's 
from water boarding their employees. It did not seem necessary to have such a policy until 
now. However, when trying to determine whether the public policy exception is applicable, 
this Court has held: 
The analysis of whether the public policy exception applies 
to a particular legal right or privilege will frequently require 
a balancing of competing legitimate interests: The interests 
of the employer to regulate the workplace environment to 
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promote productivity, security, and similar lawful business 
objectives and the interests of the employees to maximize 
access to their statutory and constitutional rights within the 
workplace 'Public policy1 is a label we attach to those 
shared expectations and standards of conduct which have 
acquired both widespread and deeply held allegiance among 
the citizens generally. 
Hansen v. American Online, Inc., 96 P.3d 950, 953 (Utah 2004) (emphasis added). 
In this case, defendants have no interest in using coercive interrogation techniques 
such as water boarding as motivational exercises for their employees. Indeed, such conduct 
is wholly unrelated to any lawful business objective. Of significance, as well, is this Court's 
acknowledgment that an employer interest is in the security of the workplace. Hansen, 96 
P.3d at 953. Defendants have completely abrogated their obligations to that interest by and 
through the conduct alleged in Hudgens' Complaint. 
For his part, Hudgens has an undeniable and deep-seated interest and expectation that 
whatever burdens and difficulties his job may entail, he is entitled to treatment from his 
employer that protects his physical and emotional well-being and does not violate Utah's 
civil and criminal laws alike. Moreover, this interest and expectation is not limited to 
Hudgens but has undoubtedly gained widespread and deeply held allegiance among 
Hudgens' fellow citizens. As such, the expectation of physical and emotional safety in the 
workplace is indeed an important public policy. Hudgens' termination violated that policy 
and the at-will doctrine does not apply. 
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Moreover, the unique facts of this case are very much akin to a specific category 
identified by this Court that involves a ''clear and substantial public policy," to wit, 
discharging an employee for refusing to commit an unlawful act. Touchard v. La-Z-Boy. 
Inc., 148 P.3d 945, 948 (Utah 2006). Here, Hudgens was constructively discharged for 
refusing to work in an environment in which his employer behaved in an unlawful manner 
towards him. Specifically, Hudgens refused to subject himself to the possibility that he 
would once again be restrained by his co-workers while a supervisor poured a gallon jug of 
water into his nose and mouth. Nor would he continue to work in an environment in which 
other forms of assault and intentional infliction of emotional harm were carried out. See 
Verified Complaint at f 10, Addendum, Ex. A, R. 10. Hudgens stated a claim for wrongful 
termination of Utah law. Moreover, to the extent he did not in his original Complaint, he 
explicitly pled them in his Proposed Verified Amended Complaint. See Addendum at f f 30-
32, Ex. C, R. 97 - 96. 
As stated previously, Utah law has long recognized that dismissal is a harsh remedy. 
Hudgens' case should be allowed to proceed through the discovery process so that a full 
record may be developed. In this way, the Court may have all the relevant factual 




IIL THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING HUDGENS 
LEAVE TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT. 
The Trial Court did not issue a written ruling stating why it denied Hudgens' Motion 
for Leave to Amend. This, in itself, constitutes a per se abuse of discretion under Utah law. 
Kelly v. Hard Money Funding. Inc.. 87 P.3d 734, 746 (Utah App. 2004). It appears, 
however, that the Court did not believe Hudgens had articulated a legally cognizable public 
policy that would act as an exception to the at-will employment doctrine under Utah law nor 
did the Court believe that Hudgens had adequately stated a claim for intentional torts that was 
not barred by the exclusivity provision of the Utah Worker's Compensation Act. However, 
these decisions were an abuse of the Court's discretion. 
A Trial Court abuses its discretion when it exceeds the range of discretion allowed for 
the particular act under review. Rivera v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 1 P.3d 539, 542 
n. 2 (Utah 2000). While it is undeniable that the Trial Court has discretion to grant or deny 
a motion for leave to amend, that discretion is not boundless. "The court's ultimate goal 
is to have the 'real controversy between the parties presented, their rights determined 
and the case decided.'" Savage v. Utah Youth Village, 104 P.3d 1242, 1245 (Utah 2004) 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
As has been discussed elsewhere in this brief, Hudgens' proposed Amended 
Complaint directly addressed the concerns raised by the Trial Court in its July 23 ruling. 
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Thus, paragraph 17 of the Amended Complaint specifically alleges that defendant had a 
conscious and deliberate intent to inflict an injury upon Hudgens: 
17. Christopherson had a conscious and deliberate intent to 
injure Hudgens by use of water boarding. This is so 
because Christopherson believed that the only way in 
which the motivational exercise could succeed was to 
cause Hudgens to experience the panic and suffocation 
integral to the purpose and functioning of waterboarding. 
This is why Christopherson directed a team member to 
hold Hudgens' head in place so that it would not move as 
he poured water in Hudgens' nose and mouth. This is 
why Christopherson did not stop pouring the water into 
Hudgens' nose and mouth until the jug was empty even 
though he saw Hudgens struggling to breathe. In other 
words, by consciously and deliberately waterboarding 
Hudgens, Christopherson exhibited a conscious and 
deliberate intent to cause an injury to Hudgens. 
Proposed Amended Verified Complaint at f 17, Addendum, Ex. C, R. 99. 
Similarly, Hudgens alleged a clear public policy exception to the at-will doctrine in 
his Proposed Verified Amended Complaint. Specifically, paragraphs 30 - 32 of Hudgens' 
Proposed Verified Amended Complaint alleged: 
30. The constructive termination of Hudgens violated a 
public policy in Utah regarding the physical and 
emotional integrity of Utah citizens, particularly in the 
workplace. This policy is found directly in numerous 
Utah case authorities, statutes and governmental 
pronouncements. 
31. Allowing Prosper and Christopherson to avoid any 
consequences of their assault on the physical and 
emotional integrity of Hudgens jeopardizes the public 
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policy articulated above. In fact, it would sanction an 
egregious violation of that policy. 
32. The public policy of protecting the Utah citizens from 
emotional and physical assault in the workplace is 
directly connected to Hudgens' termination. This is so 
because the waterboarding episode, which was a direct 
violation of the public policy in that it violated the 
physical and emotional integrity of Hudgens, caused 
Hudgens to leave Prosper. 
Proposed Amended Verified Complaint at fflf 30 - 32, Addendum, Ex. C , R. 97-96. 
These allegations state viable claims under Utah law. They deserve a chance to be 
examined, explored and developed. Nearly every case relied upon by defendants to defeat 
Hudgens' intentional tort claims was decided on summary judgment or at trial. There is very 
little precedent for deciding a case such as this on a motion to dismiss. Clearly, both the trial 
courts and the appellate courts in Utah benefit from a full factual record in cases such as 
these. The Trial Court's decision to deny leave to amend truncated a very important process. 
In failing to account for Hudgens express allegation of conscious and deliberate intent 
to cause injury, as set forth in paragraph 17 of his Proposed Verified Amended Complaint, 
Addendum, Ex. B, R. 99, and in failing to address the allegations concerning the public 
policy exception to the at-will doctrine, fflf 30 - 32, Id., R. 97-96, the Trial Court exceeded 
its discretion to grant or deny a motion for leave to amend. Accordingly, the Trial Court's 
ruling should be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Accepting Hudgens' allegations as true, as the Trial Court must on a Motion to 
Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), defendants did something very wrong on that hillside that day 
in May, 2007. The Trial Court, respectfully, misapplied the standards for stating a claim 
under the substantive law and under Rule 12(b)(6). Moreover, its refusal to grant Hudgens 
leave to amend means that defendants' wrongdoing will go unpunished. This is not a result 
Utah law compels or should tolerate. The Trial Court's decisions dismissing Hudgens' 
Complaint with prejudice and denying Hudgens' Motion for Leave to Amend should be 
reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1jJ day of October, 2009. 
By 
n N. Egan (y Sea  
Attorney for Appellant/Plaintiff 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
CHAD HUDGENS. an individual. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PROSPER, INC. a Utah corporation and 
JOSHUA CHRISTOPHERSON, an 
individual. 
Defendants. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT AND 
JURY DEMAND 
Civil No. (O^OjOO^ (/1 
Honorable 
(Jury Trial Demanded) 
COMES NOW plaintiff Chad Hudgens C'Hudgens") and complains and alleges against 
defendants Prosper, Inc. and Joshua Christopherson ("defendants") as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff Chad Hudgens is a resident of Utah County, Utah. 
2. Defendant Prosper, Inc. is a resident of Utah County, Utah. 
3. Defendant Joshua Christopherson is a resident of Utah County, Utah. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
4. This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-3-4. 
5. Venue is proper in this Court under U.C.A. §§ 78-13-5 and 7. 
BACKGROUND FACTS 
6. Prosper provides self-help and motivational coaching to individual clients. During 
all relevant times, Hudgens was an employee of Prosper. 
7. Hudgens was 26 years old and had been working at Prosper for 10 months at the time 
of the episodes alleged herein. 
8. During all relevant times Christopherson was an employee of Prosper. Upon 
information and belief, Christopherson was one of Prospers top income producers. 
9. During all relevant times, Hudgens was a member of Christopherson's team. 
10. Prosper and Christopherson intentionally engaged in physically and emotionally 
abusive and intimidating conduct for the express purpose of increasing the productivity of the team. 
This intentional conduct included the following: 
a. Christopherson would draw mustaches using permanent marker on employees 
who did not meet Prosper* s performance goals; 
b. Christopherson routinely removed chairs from employees who did not meet 
Prosper" s performance goals; and 
c. Christopherson patrolled the work area utilizing a large wooden paddle which 
he routinely struck on tables and desktops in close proximity to team members; 
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11. Prosper management knew of this conduct and encouraged it because it resulted in 
increased revenues for the company. Prosper's management passed by and through Christopherson* s 
team area and was able to see moustaches on its employees, missing chairs and Christopherson* s 
paddle. 
12. On or about May 29, 2007, Christopherson asked for volunteers for a new 
motivational exercise. In his search for volunteers, Christopherson specifically challenged the 
loyalty and determination of his team members. Christopherson did not disclose what the exercise 
was. In an effort to prove his loyalty and determination to Christopherson and Prosper, Hudgens 
volunteered. 
13. Christopherson marched his entire team to the top of a hill outside the office. He 
ordered Hudgens to lie down with his head facing downhill. He instructed the other team members 
to hold Hudgens by the arms and legs. 
14. Christopherson then slowly poured a gallon jug of water over Hudgens" mouth and 
nostrils, thereby making it impossible for Hudgens for breath for a sustained period of time. 
15. Christopherson's exercise is more commonly known as "water boarding,*' a 
controversial coercive interrogation technique which some people and governments consider torture. 
It is designed to, among other things, create panic and confusion in the subject by creating the 
impression in the subject that he is drowning. 
16. Christopherson directed Hudgens* team members to hold him down even though 
Hudgens was struggling and resisting and was attempting to escape. 
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17. At the conclusion of his abusive demonstration, Christopherson told the team that he 
wanted them to work as hard on making sales as Chad had worked to breathe while he was being 
waterboarded. 
18. Following Christopherson's assault, Hudgens approached someone in Prosper's 
human resources department and explained what had just happened to him. Despite disclosing this 
information, Prosper took no action, including action against Christopherson, until after Hudgens 
left Prosper. 
19. Following Christopherson"s assault, Hudgens began to experience symptoms of 
sleeplessness, anxiety and depression. He began to feel sick to his stomach at work and was no 
longer able to work at Prosper. 
20. Because of the trauma caused by Prospers sales exercises, Hudgens has required 
psychological counseling and has suffered physical and emotional harm. 
COUNT I 
(Assault and Battery) 
21. Hudgens repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference herein the allegations set 
forth in paragraphs 1 through 20 of his Verified Complaint. 
22. Prosper and Christopherson intentionally used force on Hudgens that caused Hudgens 
to have reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm. 
23. The intentional forced used by Prosper and Christopherson did cause Hudgens bodily 
and emotional harm. 
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24. As a result of the intentional conduct of Prosper and Christopherson, Hudgens has 
suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
25. The conduct of Prosper and Hudgens was undertaken in bad faith and was in reckless 
disregard of and wanton indifference towards the rights of Hudgens, thereby entitling him to an 
award of punitive or exemplary damages. 
COUNT II 
(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress) 
26. Hudgens repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference herein the allegations set 
forth in paragraphs 1 through 25 of his Verified Complaint. 
27. Prosper and Christopherson intentionally utilized means of physical and emotional 
intimidation and cruelty for the express purpose of causing Hudgens and others to generate more 
revenue for the company. 
28. Prosper and Christopherson intentionally inflicted emotional distress on Hudgens in 
an outrageous attempt to improve his sales performance and therefore the sales performance of 
Christopherson's team and the revenue of the company. 
26. As a result of the conduct of Prosper and Christopherson, Hudgens has been damaged 
in an amount to be proven at trial. 
27. The conduct of Prosper and Hudgens was undertaken in bad faith and was in reckless 
disregard of and wanton indifference towards the rights of Hudgens, thereby entitling him to an 
award of punitive or exemplary damages. 
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COUNT ill 
(Wrongful Termination) 
28. Hudgens repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference herein the allegations set 
forth in paragraphs 1 through 27 of his Verified Complaint. 
29. Prosper and Christopherson intentionally created a work environment that made it 
impossible for Hudgens to remain employed there. 
30. The physical and emotional harm inflicted upon Hudgens caused him to leave 
Prosper. As such, the conduct of Prosper and Christopherson constitutes wrongful termination of 
Hudgens. 
31. As a result of the conduct of Prosper and Christopherson, Hudgens has been injured 
in an amount to be proven at trial. 
32. The conduct of Prosper and Hudgens was undertaken in bad faith and was in reckless 
disregard of and wanton indifference towards the rights of Hudgens, thereby entitling him to an 
award of punitive or exemplary damages. 
COUNT IV 
(Intentional Interference With Contractual Relations Against Christopherson) 
33. Hudgens repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference herein the allegations set 
forth in paragraphs 1 through 32 of his Verified Complaint. 
34. To the extent Christopherson was not acting on behalf of Prosper or working within 
the scope of his authority at Prosper, he was a stranger to the employment relationship between 
Prosper and Hudgens. 
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35. Christopherson*s physical and emotional abuse of Hudgens caused Hudgens to quit 
his job at Prosper. As such, Christopherson interfered with Hudgens* employment relationship with 
Prosper. 
36. Christopherson used improper means in interfering with Hudgens* employment 
relationship with Prosper and Christopherson acted for an improper purpose. 
37. As a result of this conduct, Hudgens has been damaged in an amount to be proven 
at trial. 
3 8. The conduct of Prosper and Hudgens was undertaken in bad faith and was in reckless 
disregard of and wanton indifference towards the rights of Hudgens, thereby entitling him to an 
award of punitive or exemplary damages. 
WHEREFORE, Hudgens respectfully prays the following relief: 
1. With respect to Count I, damages, including punitive or exemplary damages, in an 
amount to be proven at trial; 
2. With respect to Count II, damages, including punitive or exemplary damages, in an 
amount to be proven at trial; 
3. With respect to Count III, damages, in an amount to be proven at trial; 
4. With respect to Count IV, damages, in an amount to be proven at trial; 
5. All costs and fees associated with the maintenance of this action; and 
6. Any and all other relief this Court may deem just and proper. 
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REQUEST FOR JURY 
Pursuant to U. R. Civ. P. 38, Hudgens respectfully requests a jury for all claims in this action 
so triable. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /5 day of January, 2008. 
By 
Sean N. Egan 
Attorney for PlMntiff 
Plaintiffs Address: 
1166 Canyon Meadows Dr., # 2 
Provo, Utah 84606 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH) 
CHAD HUDGENS, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and states: 
I am the plaintiff in the above-captioned matter, and have read the foregoing Verified 
Complaint. Except where the allegations are based upon information and belief, I have personal 
knowledge of the facts alleged in the Verified Complaint, and know that the facts alleged are true. 
Where the allegations are based upon information and belief, I believe the facts are true based upon 
documents I have reviewed and information provided to me by others. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF fcFFA*r)s^T~ L^KE 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this j ^ d a y of January, 2008. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: Sa^urf^^a 4gx>w> &r y v ^ y r 
Residing at: 
OV/**•/**>/ 
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* y w v X ^ , CHERYL W A.DA?*JS » A/C<v^-NV-s     
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F I L E D 
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STATS O? UTAH 
UTAH CJl/^TY 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 








Date: July 23, 2008 
Case No.: 080400249 
Judge: Gary D. Stott 
On March 11, 2008, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure in response to Plaintiffs Complaint. Plaintiff filed an Opposition on April 
9, 2008, and Defendants filed a Reply Memorandum on April 21, 2008. The court heard oral 
arguments on July 14, 2008, and now issues this ruling. 
BACKGROUND 
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 
Rule 12(b)(6), the court "must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff 
and indulge all reasonable inferences in his favor." Mountcer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 
P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991). In that light, the court sets forth the facts of the case. 
Plaintiff Chad Hudgens ("Plaintiff') worked for defendant Prosper, Inc. ("Prosper"), as a 
member of the team supervised by defendant Joshua Christopherson ("Christophersoif'). 
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Prosper provides self-help and motivational coaching to individual clients and Christopherson 
was one of Prospers top income producers. Prosper and Christopherson engaged in physically 
and emotionally abusive and intimidating conduct for the express purpose of increasing the 
productivity of the team. This conduct included Christopherson patrolling the area with a large 
wooden paddle which he hit on tables and desks close to team members and removing chairs and 
drawing mustaches on team members that did not meet sales goals. 
In May of 2007, Christopherson asked for volunteers for a new motivational exercise 
without revealing the nature of the exercise. Plaintiff volunteered as a result of Christopherson's 
appeal to the loyalty and determination of his team members. Christopherson took the team 
outside to the top of a nearby hill, where he ordered Plaintiff to lie down with his head lacing 
downhill Christopherson instructed other team members to hold Plaintiff by the arms and legs 
while Christopherson slowly poured a gallon jug of water over Plaintiffs mouth and nose, 
making it impossible for Plaintiff to breathe for a period of time. As Plaintiff was snuggling, 
resisting and attempting to escape, Christopherson directed other team members to hold Plaintiff 
down. After this demonstration, Christopherson told the team that he wanted them to work as 
hard on making sales as Plaintiff had worked to breathe during the exercise. 
Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff reported the incident to an employee in Prospers human 
resources department. Prosper took no action, including action against Christopherson. until 
after Plaintiff left Prosper. After this incident. Plaintiff began to experience symptoim of 
sleeplessness, anxiety and depression. He began to feel sick to his stomach at work and was no 
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longer able to work at Prosper. As a result of the incident, Plaintiff has required psychological 
counseling and has suffered physical and emotional harm. 
DISCUSSION 
/. Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations 
Based upon the stipulation of the parties on the record, the court grants the Motion to 
Dismiss with respect to the claim for intentional interference with contractual relations. Counsel 
for Plaintiff did not object to the dismissal of this claim. According to Utah case law, the 
defendant in a case for intentional interference with contractual relations must be a third party to 
the contract. The court concludes, and the parties agree, that Christopherson was not a third 
party to the contract between Plaintiff and Prosper. Therefore, the claim for intentional 
interference with contractual relations is dismissed with prejudice. 
//. Assault and Batteiy and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
The court grants the Motion to Dismiss with respect to the causes of action for assault 
and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Section 34A-2-105(1) of the Utah 
Code states that the remedy provided in the Workers1 Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy 
of an employee who is injured or killed in the course of his employment. Utah Code Ann. § 
34A-2-105(1) (2008). As acknowledged by both parties, the Utah Supreme Court has created a 
narrow exception to the exclusiveness of the Workers' Compensation Act for those injuries that 
occur as a result of a conscious and deliberate intent on the part of the employer or its agent to 
inflict an injury upon the employee. Bryan v. Utah hit 7, 533 P.2d 892 (1975); see also Lantz v. 
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Nat 7 Semiconductor Corp., 775 P.2d 937 (Utah App. 1989). In Lantz, the Utah Court of 
Appeals explained that in order for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, it "must allege 
facts that add up to a deliberate intent to bring about injury." Id. at 940 fn. 5 (quoting 2A A. 
Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 68.14 at 13-46 (1988) (emphasis in original)). 
The allegations contained in the complaint are not sufficient to support a claim that the 
defendant had a conscious and deliberate intent to injure plaintiff. From the court's perspective, 
Christopherson undoubtedly exhibited poor judgment to take the actions that led to this case. 
However, the purpose of those actions was to use plaintiff as an example of maximum effort for 
the rest of the employees to emulate as they did work for the company. The complaint contains 
no facts showing that Christopherson took his actions based on a conscious and deliberate intent 
to injure plaintiff. Indeed, plaintiff asserts that the express purpose of Chnstopherson's abusive 
and intimidating conduct was to motivate team members, not to injure plaintiff. Therefore, the 
claims for assault, battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress are governed 
exclusively by the Workers' Compensation Act and section 34A-2-105( 1), and the Motion to 
Dismiss is granted with respect to the claims for assault and battery and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. 
///. Wrongful Termination 
The court grants the Motion to Dismiss the claim for wrongful termination. In Utah, the 
employer-employee relationship is presumed to be at-will, and a plaintiff must show that his case 
falls within one of three categories to overcome this presumption: "(1) there is an implied or 
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express agreement that the employment may be terminated only for cause or upon satisfaction of 
some agreed-upon condition; (2) a statute or regulation restricts the right of an employer to 
terminate an employee under certain conditions; or (3) the termination of employment 
constitutes a violation of a clear and substantial public policy." Touchard v. La-Z-Bo\\ Inc., 
2006 UT 71, P3 (citations omitted). Defendants argued, and Plaintiff conceded, that the first two 
categories are clearly not applicable. Therefore, the only category that is potentially applicable 
is termination in violation of public policy. 
In Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme Court 
set forth the following elements to make out a prima facie case for wrongful termination in 
violation of public policy: "an employee must show (i) that his employer terminated him; (ii) 
that a clear and substantial public policy existed; (iii) that the employee's conduct brought the 
policy into play; and (iv) that the discharge and the conduct bringing the policy into play are 
causally connected/' hi at 404 (citations omitted). The court further emphasized the 
narrowness of the public policy exception and explained that the public policy at issue is clear 
and substantial "only if plainly defined by legislative enactments, constitutional standards, or 
judicial decisions." Id. at 405. 
As Defendants have argued, Plaintiffs complaint does not even address elements (ii) 
through (iv) of the prima facie case for wrongful termination set forth in Ryan. However, in his 
Opposition and at the oral arguments, counsel for Plaintiff argued that there is public policy 
against this type of conduct which is made clear and substantial by the enactment of the statute 
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in the Utah Criminal Code prohibiting hazing. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-107.5 (2008). While 
Plaintiffs reliance on the hazing statute is interesting, it fails to show how Plaintiffs conduct 
brought the policy of the hazing statute into play, especially since the conduct is only considered 
hazing if the victim is a member or potential member of a school team or the conduct was "for 
the purpose of initiation, admission into, affiliation with, holding office in, or as a condition of 
continued membership in any organization...." Id. at (l)(b)(i). In addition, the connection 
between the policy embodied in the hazing statute and the other statutes cited by Plaintiff and the 
conduct in question here is far too tenuous to comport with the repeated statements of the Utah 
Supreme Court emphasizing the narrowness of the public policy exception. See Hansen v. Am. 
Online, Inc., 2004 UT 62, P9; Ryan, 972 P.2d at 405. The court concludes that Plaintiff has 
failed to make out a prima facie case for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. 
Therefore, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted with respect to the claim for wrongful 
termination. 
IV. Amending the Complaint 
The court denies Plaintiffs request to amend his complaint because the request fails to 
comply with Utah's formal motion practice rules. Although Plaintiff notes that leave to amend 
should be freely given where justice so requires, the Utah Supreme Court and Court of Appeals 
have explained that denying a request to amend a complaint based on a failure to comply with 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is well within the discretion of the trial court. Holmes 
Development, LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38; Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, P42. Indeed, 
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Plaintiffs request is nearly identical to the requests made in both Holmes and Coroles, the 
denials of which were upheld by the Utah Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, respectively. 
Because Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure, his request to amend 
the complaint is denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) are 
granted as to all claims. The claims for assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, and wrongful termination are dismissed without prejudice, and the claim for intentional 
interference with contractual relations is dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs request to amend 
his complaint is denied. Counsel for Defendants shall prepare an order reflecting this ruling and 
submit it to the court for signature. 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
CHAD HUDGENS, an individual. ) 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. j 
PROSPER, INC. a Utah corporation and 
JOSHUA CHRISTOPHERSON, an ; 
individual, 
Defendants. 
VERIFIED AMENDED COMPLAINT 
1 AND JURY DEMAND 
I Civil No. 08-0400249 
i Honorable Gary D. Stott 
) (Jury Trial Demanded) 
COMES NOW plaintiff Chad Hudgens ("Hudgens") and complains and alleges against 
defendants Prosper, Inc. and Joshua Christopherson ("defendants") as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff Chad Hudgens is a resident of Utah County, Utah. 
2. Defendant Prosper, Inc. is a resident of Utah County, Utah. 
3. Defendant Joshua Christopherson is a resident of Utah County, Utah. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
4. This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-3-4. 
5. Venue is proper in this Court under U.C.A. §§ 78-13-5 and 7. 
BACKGROUND FACTS 
6. Prosper provides self-help and motivational coaching to individual clients. During 
all relevant times, Hudgens was an employee of Prosper. 
7. Hudgens was 26 years old and had been working at Prosper for 10 months at the time 
of the episodes alleged herein. 
8. During all relevant times Christopherson was an employee of Prosper. Upon 
information and belief, Christopherson was one of Prospers top income producers. 
9. During all relevant times, Hudgens was a member of Christopherson's team. 
10. Prosper and Christopherson intentionally engaged in physically and emotionally 
abusive and intimidating conduct for the express purpose of increasing the productivity of the team. 
This intentional conduct included the following: 
a. Christopherson would draw mustaches using permanent marker on employees 
whc did not meet Prosper's performance goals; 
b. Christopherson routinely removed chairs from employees who did not meet 
Prosper's performance goals; and 
c. Christopherson patrolled the work area utilizing a large wooden paddle which 
he routinely struck on tables and desktops in close proximity to team members; 
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11. Prosper management knew of this conduct and encouraged it because it resulted in 
increased revenues for the company. Prosper's management passed by and through Christopherson's 
team area and was able to see moustaches on its employees, missing chairs and Christopherson's 
paddle. 
12. On or about May 29, 2007, Christopherson asked for volunteers for a new 
motivational exercise. In his search for volunteers, Christopherson specifically challenged the 
loyalty and determination of his team members. Christopherson did not disclose what the exercise 
was. In an effort to prove his loyalty and determination to Christopherson and Prosper, and thereby 
be considered a favored member of the team, Hudgens volunteered. 
13. Christopherson marched his entire team to the top of a hill outside the office. He 
ordered Hudgens to lie down with his head facing downhill. He instructed the other team members 
to hold Hudgens by the arms and legs. 
14. Christopherson then slowly poured a gallon jug of water over Hudgens1 mouth and 
nostrils, thereby making it impossible for Hudgens to breathe for a sustained period of time. 
15. Christopherson's exercise is more commonly known as "waterboarding," a 
controversial coercive interrogation technique which some people and governments consider torture. 
It is designed to, among other things, cause injury by creating panic and confusion in the subject by 
creating the impression in the subject that he is drowning. 
16. Christopherson directed Hudgens' team members to hold him down even though 
Hudgens was struggling and resisting and was attempting to escape. Christopherson did not stop 
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pouring water into Hudgens' mouth and nostrils even though he saw that Hudgens was struggling 
to breathe. 
17. Christopherson had a conscious and deliberate intent to injure Hudgens by use of 
waterboarding. This is so because Christopherson believed that the only way in which the 
motivational exercise could succeed was to cause Hudgens to experience the panic and suffocation 
integral to the purpose and functioning of waterboarding. This is why Christopherson directed a 
team member to hold Hudgens" head in place so that it would not move as he poured water in 
Hudgens' nose and mouth. This is why Christopherson did not stop pouring water into Hudgens' 
nose and mouth until the jug was empty even though he saw Hudgens struggling to breathe. In other 
words, by consciously and deliberately waterboarding Hudgens, Christopherson exhibited a 
conscious and deliberate intent to cause an injury to Hudgens. 
18. Following Christopherson's intentional assault Hudgens approached someone in 
Prospers human resources department and explained what had just happened to him. Despite 
disclosing this information, Prosper took no action, including action against Christopherson, until 
after Hudgens left Prosper. 
19. Following Christopherson1 s assault Hudgens began to experience symptoms of 
sleeplessness, anxiety and depression. He began to feel sick to his stomach at work and was no 
longer able to work at Prosper. 
20. Because of the trauma caused by Prosper" s sales exercises, Hudgens has required 
psychological counseling and has suffered physical and emotional harm. 
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COUNT I 
(Assault and Battery) 
21. Hudgens repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference herein the allegations set 
forth in paragraphs 1 through 20 of his Verified Complaint. 
22. Prosper and Christopherson intentionally used force on Hudgens that caused Hudgens 
to have reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm. 
23. The intentional forced used by Prosper and Christopherson did cause Hudgens bodily 
and emotional harm. 
24. As a result of the intentional conduct of Prosper and Christopherson, Hudgens has 
suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
25. The conduct of Prosper and Hudgens was undertaken in bad faith and was in reckless 
disregard of and wanton indifference towards the rights of Hudgens, thereby entitling him to an 
award of punitive or exemplary damages. 
COUNT II 
(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress) 
26. Hudgens repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference herein the allegations set 
forth m paragraphs 1 through 25 of his Verified Complaint. 
27. Prosper and Christopherson intentionally utilized means of physical and emotional 
intimidation and cruelty for the express purpose of causing Hudgens and others to generate more 
revenue for the company. 
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28. Prosper and Christopherson intentionally inflicted emotional distress on Hudgens in 
the erroneous belief that the emotional distress they intended Hudgens to experience would improve 
his sales performance and therefore the sales performance of Christopherson's team and the revenue 
of the company. 
26. As a result of the intentional conduct of Prosper and Christopherson, Hudgens has 
been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
27. The conduct of Prosper and Hudgens was undertaken in bad faith and was in reckless 
disregard of and wanton indifference towards the rights of Hudgens, thereby entitling him to an 
award of punitive or exemplary damages. 
COUNT HI 
(Wrongful Termination) 
28. Hudgens repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference herein the allegations set 
forth in paragraphs 1 through 27 of his Verified Complaint. 
29. Prosper and Christopherson intentionally created a work environment that made it 
impossible for Hudgens to remain employed there. As such, Hudgens was constructively terminated 
by Prosper. 
30. The constructive termination of Hudgens violated a public policy in Utah regarding 
the physical and emotional integrity of Utah citizens, particularly in the workplace. This policy is 
found directly in numerous Utah case authorities, statutes and governmental pronouncements. 
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31. Allowing Prosper and Christopherson to avoid any consequences of their assault on 
the physical and emotional integrity of Hudgens jeopardizes the public policy articulated above. In 
fact, it would sanction an egregious violation of that policy. 
32. The public policy of protecting Utah citizens from emotional and physical assault in 
the workplace is directly connected to Hudgens' termination. This is so because the waterboarding 
episode, which was a direct violation of the public policy in that it violated the physical and 
emotional integrity of Hudgens, caused Hudgens to leave Prosper. 
33. As a result of the wrongful constructive termination of Hudgens by Prosper and 
Christopherson, Hudgens has been injured in an amount to be proven at trial. 
34. The conduct of Prosper and Hudgens was undertaken in bad faith and was in reckless 
disregard of and wanton indifference towards the rights of Hudgens, thereby entitling him to an 
award of punitive or exemplary damages. 
WHEREFORE, Hudgens respectfully prays the following relief: 
1. With respect to Count I, damages, including punitive or exemplary damages, in an 
amount to be proven at trial; 
2. With respect to Count II, damages, including punitive or exemplary damages, in an 
amount to be proven at ti ial, 
3. With respect to Count III, damages, in an amount to be proven at trial, 
4. All costs and fees associated with the maintenance of this action; and 
5. Any and all other relief this Court may deem just and proper. 
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REQUEST FOR JURY 
Pursuant to U. R. Civ. P. 38, Hudgens respectfully requests a jury for all claims in this action 
so triable. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of October, 2008. 
B y _ . 
Sean N. Egan 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
CHAD HUDGENS, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and states: 
I am the plaintiff in the above-captioned matter, and have read the foregoing Verified 
Amended Complaint. Except where the allegations are based upon information and belief, I have 
personal knowledge of the facts alleged in the Verified Amended Complaint, and know that the facts 
alleged are true. Where the allegations are based upon information and belief, I believe the facts are 
true based upon documents 1 have reviewed and information provided to me by others. 
By 
CHAD HUDGENS 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of October, 2008. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: 
Residing at: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of October, 2008, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing VERIFIED AMENDED COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND was served upon the 
person named below, at the address set out below their name, either by mailing postage prepaid, 
hand-delivery, Federal Express, or by telecopying to them, a true and correct copy of said document. 
Evan A. Schmutz, Esq. 
Andy V. Wright, Esq. 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ 
River View Plaza - Suite 300 
4844 North 300 West 
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on M Huntsman, Jr. 
iovernor 
)eclaration 
Whereas, residents of the State of Utah deserve to live in communities that support 
afe and healthy living; and 
Whereas, community and workplace safety should be a major concern for all Utah 
:itizens, employers, employees and their families; and 
Whereas, safe communities require the cooperation of all levels of government, 
asiness and industry, as well as the general public; and 
Whereas, workplace and other accidents, illnesses, and deaths continue to cause 
intold human pain and suffering to injured Utah workers and their families; and 
WHEREAS, citizens deserve a solution to statewide community safety, workplace 
safety and health threats; and 
Whereas, the summer season, traditionally a time of increased accidental injuries and 
fatalities, is an appropriate time to focus attention on injury risks and prevention; and 
Whereas, successful workplace safety programs are providing that solution by 
iucing accidents, illnesses, and deaths; and by increasing productivity, improving morale, 
lowering workers' compensation premiums, and resulting in improved working 
environments; and 
Whereas, The Utah Labor Commission and the Utah Department of Public Safety 
continue to initiate safety efforts, assure occupational safety and health and provide 
information and services for Utah employers, employees, and all citizens of Utah; 
Now, Therefore, I, Jon M. Huntsman, Jr., Governor of the State of Utah, do join with 
the nation in "Celebrating Safe Communities", the theme for 2007 National Safety Month, 
and do hereby declare the month of June 2007 as 
Community and Workplace Safety Month 
in Utah, and call upon all Utah employers, employees, and citizens to make safety and the 
reductic 1 of accidents, illnesses, and deaths the primary objective to improve the quality of 
life for all Utah residents. 
(Signature) 
